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Executive summary 
 
 
 
Public power in England is being restructured.  Recent months have witnessed a 
fast-moving process in which the Government and council leaders across the country 
have broken new ground with a series of negotiated agreements designed to devolve 
power to areas within England. 
 
The objectives of devolution 
 
There are several strands in the debate about devolution in England and, not 
surprisingly, there are competing views on what devolution is supposed to achieve.  
The Government has not set down any clear, measurable targets for devolution, 
preferring, instead, a bottom-up process in which localities indicate their own 
priorities.   
 
There are at least four potential objectives for devolution. Strategies to advance 
progress towards several of these objectives at once can, of course, be pursued.  
However, it is helpful to separate them out so that the desired outcomes of public 
policy can be made explicit: 
 
 Economic.  The claim is made that economic growth can be accelerated if 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas were less dependent on centralised 
funding.  Devolution can enable localities to respond dynamically to the needs 
and opportunities of their economies. 
 
 Social.  A different argument is that devolution can lead to the development 
of more effective ways of tackling social challenges – for example, growing 
inequality, inadequate housing supply and issues relating to health, education 
and public safety.  Devolution can, by integrating separate services more 
effectively, and by combining the efforts of the public, private and non-profit 
sector, enable a range of pressing social issues to be addressed in a more 
cost-effective way. 
 
 Environmental.  A third argument is that devolution can play a vital role in 
promoting sustainable development and the creation of more sustainable 
patterns of living.  Growing scientific evidence relating to the adverse impacts 
of climate change, coupled with international recognition of the seriousness of 
the situation, suggest that urgent action is needed.  Devolution can promote 
sound spatial planning of metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas and a 
more eco-friendly approach to, for example, transport planning and urban 
growth management. 
 
 Democratic.  A fourth reason for devolving power in England is to bring 
government closer to the people, to strengthen civic engagement and 
revitalise local democracy.  Voter turnout in local elections in England is well 
below that found in other western democracies and this is troubling.  Many in 
local government believe that devolution can increase public involvement in 
local affairs and ensure policy making and services are responsive to local 
needs. 
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To date much of the national debate about devolution has focussed on economic 
goals.  The restructuring of power in modern England raises concerns that go well 
beyond economic considerations.  Combined authorities will want to develop and 
spell out the full range of objectives that they wish devolution to achieve in their area 
and, if devolution is to mean anything at all, they must be free to do this. 
 
Purpose of this report 
 
Devolution creates significant opportunities for councillors to shape the future of local 
government in England.  This report is intended to help councils think through how 
the devolution of power within England can strengthen local government.  More 
specifically, it aims to widen the conversation about the design of executive 
governance arrangements for combined authorities with learning from abroad. 
 
The report is intended to inject new ideas into the debate relating to cross-boundary 
governance, to examine the strengths and weaknesses of alternative governance 
models and to act as a resource that can help councils develop their own thinking. 
 
The report is intended to help councils to: 
 
 explore different options for the institutional design of governance models 
suited to the dynamics of devolution in England 
 
 expand the horizons of all those thinking through the implications of cross-
boundary governance by drawing on the experiences of other countries 
 
 examine the strengths and weaknesses of alternative institutional designs 
 
 develop their own proposals for devolved governance able to provide strong 
leadership and effective, efficient and accountable local democracy. 
 
Key findings 
 
This report examines international trends and presents and evaluates four examples 
of sub-national governance according to six principles.  Through this approach a 
range of evidence is presented that will hopefully prove useful in helping combined 
authorities and other areas with devolved governance structures consider and 
address their own strategic choices. Key findings of this report include: 
 
 The international evidence shows that different cities have adopted different 
models of city leadership and that no one model is superior to the others.  In 
particular, cities across the world can and have thrived without a directly 
elected mayor. 
 
 In local governments across the world there is huge variation in the way 
powers are distributed between the Executive and the Assembly.  Combined 
authorities and other areas with devolved governance arrangements will wish 
to develop their own ideas on this power-sharing relationship.  It would also 
be wise to build in opportunities to review the balance of powers in the light of 
experience. 
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 There is room for combined authorities and other areas with devolved 
governance arrangements to invent new ways of presenting issues and public 
policy choices to their citizens.  The ‘Public Engagement Guide’ published by 
Portland Metro in particular provides an excellent example of good practice in 
relation to transparency and efficiency. 
 
 Devolved areas wishing to ensure that councillors with different kinds of 
experience are able to exercise senior leadership roles may feel that mayoral 
models have limitations.  That question aside, it is clear that combined 
authorities, whether they have directly elected mayors or not, can invent an 
array of new arrangements for ensuring inclusive leadership in their 
constitutions.  There are opportunities for creating innovative arrangements 
for a wide range of voices to be heard. 
 
 International experience suggests that a much more open scrutiny process is 
likely to be both more effective in delivering results, and more attractive to 
citizens. 
 
It should be stressed that this report does not make recommendations on how to 
design combined authority governance structures. Rather, the report presents 
objective evidence about some of the most effective models of sub-national 
governance to be found in the world today.   
 
It is hoped that this evidence will enable councillors, officers and others to make 
informed judgements about how to design effective combined authority governance 
structures suited to the local situation. 
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Report outline 
 
Section 1 – introduces the report and makes the case for widening the conversation 
about how to design combined authorities. 
 
Section 2 – explains why governments elsewhere are also reforming their 
arrangements for sub-national governance, identifies the three main routes being 
tried out and highlights insights for the devolution debate in England. 
 
Section 3 – identifies six principles of good governance for combined authorities.  
These have emerged following conversations with senior councillors in England as 
well as detailed study of the extensive academic literature on models of sub-national 
governance.  The six principles are: 
 
 civic leadership 
 considered judgement 
 transparency and efficiency 
 accountability and legitimacy 
 inclusive public involvement 
 inclusive business involvement. 
 
Section 4 – presents four ‘Innovation Stories’ documenting bold changes in sub-
national governance that have been implemented in four different countries.  These 
short accounts are written to a standard template to enable the strengths and 
weaknesses of the four stories to be revealed.   
 
The four have been chosen because they are all respected examples of reform and 
they illustrate rather different strategies.  The four examples are: 
 
 Auckland Council, New Zealand  
 Greater London Authority, UK 
 Portland Metro, Oregon, USA 
 Association of the Region of Stuttgart, Germany. 
 
In each case an evaluative commentary is provided assessing each example against 
the six principles set out in section 3. 
 
In the light of the preceding analysis, section 5 presents the main strategic choices 
for combined authorities.  It discusses the six principles in turn and, by drawing on 
the experience of the authorities featured in section 4, it identifies ten strategic 
choices. 
 
Finally, an Annex provides an ‘at a glance’ overview of the way devolution policy in 
England has evolved in recent years. 
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1. The dynamics of devolution in England 
 
 
 
The relationship between local and central government is being reconfigured.  
Moreover, this restructuring of power in England is happening at pace.  In the period 
since May 2015 the Government and council leaders across the country have broken 
new ground with almost a dozen negotiated agreements designed to devolve power 
to areas within England.  One result is that a growing number of combined authorities 
have been established, or are being established, in various parts of England.1  
 
These changes, while not without controversy, create opportunities for elected 
council leaders to shape the future of local government.  The Government recognises 
the principle that a vibrant local democracy is essential if national prosperity is to be 
enhanced and regional disparities in the quality of life are to be reduced. In turn, 
councils recognise that devolution provides opportunities to acquire the functions and 
finances vital to driving growth and improving public services in their area. 
 
The Cities and Local Government Devolution Act (2016) is an important enabling 
piece of legislation that heralds a major effort to restructure local/central relations in 
England.  Groupings of councils across the country have been very active in working 
across administrative boundaries to come up with innovative suggestions for 
‘devolution deals’ and much progress has been made in a short space of time. 
 
This paper offers a fresh perspective on the development of effective and 
accountable devolved governance in England.  It steps back from the details of the 
new English legislation and offers lessons from a study of international governance 
models.  
 
The current context around devolution policy 
 
In the period since the 2015 general election, ministers have pushed devolution 
policy along at great speed – with the announcements contained in the 2016 Budget 
bringing the total number of devolution deals agreed to date up to almost a dozen. 
 
This speed of change has attracted criticism. The House of Commons Communities 
and Local Government Committee in their assessment of devolution policy, 
‘Devolution: the next five years and beyond’, concluded that: 
 
‘… the policy risks being rushed and appearing driven by a purely political 
timetable…  We have found a significant lack of public consultation and 
engagement at all stages in the devolution process.’2  
 
The Committee also stated that there are no clear, measurable objectives for 
devolution, and that efforts are not being made to inject openness or transparency 
into deal negotiations.3  
 
Other reports have also raised concerns.  For example, the All-Party Parliamentary 
Group (APPG) on Reform, Decentralisation and Devolution has considered how to 
better achieve devolution across the whole of the UK. In their report, ‘Devolution and 
the Union’, the group states: 
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‘Progress to date has been piecemeal; devolution arrangements emerging 
through bilateral conversations and narrow constitutional amendments that fail to 
take a view in the round.’4 (4) 
 
The group argues that reducing the gap between those who govern, and those who 
are governed, requires a more ambitious conversation.  They advocate principles for 
a stable Union that resonate with those set out by the Local Government Association 
(LGA). 
 
The LGA’s principles for devolution across the UK 
 
The LGA is strongly committed to the devolution of more powers to elected local 
authorities.  In a DevoNext paper published soon after the general election, ‘English 
Devolution: Local solutions for a successful nation’, the LGA outlined why devolution 
matters and how devolution policy can be strengthened.5 Based on work with its 
sister organisations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (COSLA, WLGA and 
NILGA) the LGA set out three principles to ensure that devolution delivers better 
outcomes for people and places: 
 
 Subsidiarity – taking decisions closer to the people affected leads to better 
outcomes and saves the taxpayer money. 
 
 Legal standing for local government – the legal position of elected local 
governments needs to be secured and enhanced. 
 
 Fiscal autonomy – greater fiscal autonomy, starting with fiscal retention, at 
the sub-regional level will enable more places to invest in the infrastructure 
needed to unlock growth and deliver modern public services. 
 
These fundamental principles should shape the conversation about the institutional 
design of devolved governance arrangements in England. 
 
The LGA has been clear that greater devolution across England is the most effective 
way to improve public services, drive growth and build inclusive, connected 
economies. While they have sounded a positive note regarding the process to date, 
they remain committed to ensuring that the benefits of devolution should be open to 
all parts of the country, including non-metropolitan areas. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the LGA has also taken a nuanced position regarding the assessment 
of devolution’s objectives, believing that, at root, devolution is about passing powers 
and responsibilities from the national to the local level in order to drive growth and 
improve public services.  
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2. Innovation in sub-national governance – an 
international perspective 
 
 
 
Countries across the world are striving to adapt their sub-national governance 
arrangements to take on current and emerging challenges, not least the explosive 
population growth of cities and city-regions and the growing interconnectivity of urban 
and non-urban economic geographies.6 While the steps now being taken to devolve 
powers and responsibilities to combined authorities within England are distinctive, it 
is clear that they form part of a wider international trend towards developing 
innovative forms of governance to tackle issues that show little respect for 
administrative boundaries. 
 
In the last fifty years or so many nation states have moved to reform their systems of 
local governance, particularly their arrangements for metropolitan governance.7 It 
follows that there are opportunities for fruitful international exchange of experiences 
on topics like: local government reform and reorganisation, the modification of 
local/central relationships, the design of city-region governance arrangements, and 
the invention of new ways of working with citizens and local businesses.8  
 
In this section we examine these international trends and consider three questions: 
 
 Why are governments reforming sub-national governance? 
 
 What reform options are being tried out? 
 
 What general international insights emerge for the devolution debate in 
England? 
 
International driving forces of reform 
 
The reasons why particular nation states choose to reform their sub-national 
governance arrangements reflect local circumstances, socio-cultural traditions and 
specific political imperatives.  Nevertheless, it is possible to identify three related sets 
of driving forces that appear to be influencing the devolution agenda in different 
countries and contexts.  
 
The rise of challenges that reach beyond individual municipalities 
 
Traditional structures of local government, while they can enable councillors to speak 
with authority on behalf of well-defined place-based communities, can find 
themselves ill equipped to take on challenges that reach beyond the limits of 
individual municipalities.  For example, in many city regions rapid urbanisation means 
that the boundaries of local authorities designed in a different era now appear 
anachronistic.  Pressing challenges like transportation, housing, economic 
development and the creation of sustainable cities require effective policy making 
arrangements covering relatively large areas as well as local responsiveness. 
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Place-based international economic competition 
 
In our rapidly globalising world it is increasingly the case that localities need to be 
able to compete with localities in other countries – to attract investment, talented 
people and visitors. Technology too has played a critical role, opening up new sites 
of commerce and reshaping the economic boundaries between urban and non-urban 
areas. It follows that local governance arrangements need to be designed to ensure 
that localities can compete internationally.  On the whole, this suggests that it is 
desirable to, either, create larger units of local government, and/or introduce 
collaborative arrangements that enable small local authorities to pool resources so 
that they can compete internationally. 
 
Addressing growing economic and social inequalities and climate change 
 
Globalisation is creating increasingly unequal societies and the global climate change 
challenge is recognised by governments across the world as urgent.  Some countries 
are re-designing their metropolitan governance arrangements to ensure that sound 
spatial planning leads to the creation of inclusive, healthy, sustainable cities.  Sound 
strategic planning implies the need for elected local authorities that can lead and 
shape the socio-economic geography of entire city regions.  An important argument 
here is that very small municipalities probably lack the geographical dimensions and 
organisational resources to even up life chances for disadvantaged groups in society. 
 
What are the main reform options? 
 
Options for the reform of metropolitan and non-metropolitan governance lie along a 
spectrum.  For simplicity it is helpful to imagine three ways of bringing about effective 
cooperation and strategic planning across areas that are bigger than the existing 
territorial units of local government9: 
 
 merge existing units of local government into larger units 
 
 pragmatic adjustment 
 
 promote self-interested competition. 
 
In any given setting there may be overlaps between these three strategies.  
However, for the purpose of analysis, it is helpful to separate them out. 
 
Merge existing municipalities into larger units of local government 
 
This is a route that has been followed in the UK.  For example, in 1969 the Royal 
Commission on Local Government in England (known as the Redcliffe-Maud report) 
stressed that local government needs to do four things: 
 
 perform efficiently a wide range of profoundly important tasks concerned with 
the safety, health, and well-being of people in different localities 
 
 attract and hold the interests of its citizens 
 develop enough inherent strength to deal with national authorities in a valid 
partnership 
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 adapt, without disruption, to the unprecedented process of change in the way 
people live and work.10  
 
While the Government of the day did not accept the Commission’s recommendation 
that 58 unitary authorities should be created outside the metropolitan areas, the 
Local Government Act 1972 reduced the number of elected local authorities in 
England from over 1,300 to around 400. In doing so, the Act created a smaller 
number of more powerful local governments. 
 
In section 4 we will see how this idea of merging separate local authorities into a 
new, larger and more powerful territorial unit remains an option for reformers.  The 
example chosen to illustrate this strategy is the creation of the Auckland Council – a 
so-called ‘super-city’ – by the New Zealand government in 2010. 
 
Pragmatic adjustment 
 
A second way of producing effective collective action for large areas is through inter-
local agreements, coalition building and/or the introduction of an additional tier of 
government designed to focus on strategic issues, for example, environmental 
protection and/or economic development.  Pragmatic adjustment aims to strengthen 
the governance capacity of metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas without 
abolishing any existing elected local authorities. 
 
There are many ways of bringing about pragmatic adjustment and these vary 
considerably across nation states.  For example, in the USA many metropolitan 
areas have councils of governments (COGs).  These are voluntary associations of 
local governments that function as a forum for regional policy dialogue.  Local 
authorities in the metropolitan area are usually represented on the board of the COG 
by an elected official, such as the mayor or a member of the local council.  Some 
COGs include representatives of other local and regional authorities, as well as 
representatives of private sector associations. 
 
In many American metropolitan areas there are metropolitan planning organisations 
(MPOs).  The federal government encourages this approach to collaboration by, for 
example, requiring that any federal funds spent on transportation infrastructure in a 
metropolitan area must be channelled through a local MPO.  
 
However, independent research on US metropolitan governance suggests that both 
COGs and MPOs are not, in reality, all that effective in tackling present and emerging 
city regional challenges.11 Power remains very fragmented and this limits the 
capacity of the city region level of governance to take action. 
 
Portland and Minneapolis-Saint Paul are exceptions to the dominant pattern of 
metropolitan governance in the USA.  They both have relatively strong arrangements 
for city-region governance.  Section 4 provides a profile of Portland Metro as it is an 
intriguing example of bold innovation.  Metro has the status of a full local government 
with a leadership elected by popular vote.  It is, in effect, a second tier of local 
government sitting above the level of the municipalities, and below the level of the 
state of Oregon. 
The Greater London Authority is also profiled in section 4 as it, too, provides a 
respected example of pragmatic adjustment.  In this case the upper tier of local 
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government, sitting above the London boroughs, is directly elected – with a directly 
elected mayor and an assembly of 25 members. 
 
A further example of pragmatic adjustment presented in section 4 is the Association 
of the Region of Stuttgart (Verband Region Stuttgart, aka VRS).  Again there is an 
elected regional assembly.  In this model there is no directly elected mayor.  Instead, 
the assembly selects a chair from its ranks. 
 
Promote self-interested competition 
 
A third approach to city-region governance tries to make a virtue out of governmental 
fragmentation.  From this perspective, small units of local government should behave 
as if they were in a marketplace, and they should compete with one another to attract 
residents and businesses.  Self-interested competition, so the argument goes, 
enables citizens and businesses to ‘vote with their feet’ by finding localities that offer 
attractive packages of services and tax burdens. 
 
This ‘public choice’ theory of local government has a long tradition in the USA, and 
there is an interesting body of scholarship examining these ideas.12 However, the 
conditions it assumes bear little resemblance to reality.   Most citizens and 
businesses in a given city-region are not, in fact, very mobile, and the theory 
disregards many important considerations – for example, the feelings of attachment 
people may have to the place where they live, the value of local social networks and 
the costs of constantly uprooting and moving.  The theory, as it stands against the 
very idea of collaboration between units of local government, offers little that is 
relevant to the current discussion about the creation of combined authorities in 
England.  It does not offer practical solutions to the challenges outlined above.  
 
Insights for the devolution debate in England 
 
Four main insights flow from the discussion outlined above and from the wider 
literature on local governance innovation in other countries: 
 
 the movement to strengthen sub-national governance is an international one 
 
 city-regions are important drivers of modern global prosperity and information 
technology is increasingly shifting the economic boundaries between urban 
and non-urban geographies 
 
 international comparisons can spur fresh thinking 
 
 the powers and status of elected local authorities vary enormously. 
 
Strengthening sub-national governance has international momentum 
 
Responding to new challenges requires adjusting the distribution of power to match 
the reality of where people live and work, rather than linking policies to administrative 
boundaries that were, in some cases, drawn centuries ago.13  
This is not just about building collective self-determination in metropolitan and non-
metropolitan areas.  It also involves strengthening multi-level governance in order to 
improve the impact of all public policies on defined territories. 
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City regions and shifting economic boundaries 
 
Cities, or more precisely city-regions, are playing an increasingly important role in the 
economies of countries across the world.  There are now more than 300 city-regions 
with a population of more than a million.14 While there are various kinds of city-
region, it seems clear that these expanding urban agglomerations have now 
established themselves as major drivers of socio-economic change in the modern 
world.  In the UK 61 per cent of economic growth is generated by city regions, and 
yet only London registers in a list of the most significant global cities.15  
 
Having said that, we can note that 39 per cent of economic growth in the UK is 
generated by non-metropolitan areas.  As noted by the Peace Report on ‘Devolution 
to Non-Metropolitan England’ the non-metropolitan areas have a vital role to play in 
improving England’s competitiveness.16 This suggests that effective devolution is 
needed to all parts of England, not just to the city regions.    
 
International comparisons can spur fresh thinking 
 
It is misguided to scan governance practices in other countries in the hope of finding 
ready-made solutions to current challenges.  National cultures vary and cities and 
localities have different histories, experiences and characteristics. The task of 
international comparison is, then, not to search for mythical ‘best practice’ – there is 
no such thing.  Rather the aim should be discover ‘relevant practice’ – that is, insights 
and approaches that can help councils be more effective in achieving their own 
distinct objectives. 
 
The powers and status of elected local authorities vary dramatically 
 
In many countries local government enjoys constitutional protection.  This safeguards 
the local polity from unwanted interference emanating from higher tiers of 
government.  The legal independence of local government is often matched by 
significant tax raising powers, and there tends to be a high correlation between local 
government power and high voter turnout in local elections. 
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3. Ensuring good devolved governance 
arrangements 
 
 
 
Local authorities across the country are giving careful attention to the institutional 
design of the sub-national governance arrangements for devolution.  There are 
opportunities for different models within the legislative framework provided by the 
Cities and Local Government Devolution Act (2016).  Looking further ahead it is also 
desirable to consider how the governance arrangements of combined authorities 
might evolve over time. 
 
Alongside this report, the LGA has also commissioned and supported separate 
guidance: 
 
 ‘Cards on the table: tips and tricks for getting in on the action of devolution’, 
by Ed Hammond, Centre for Public Scrutiny, provides a thorough account of 
the process of securing good governance within the context of devolution.  
 
 ‘Combined authorities: a plain English Guide’ by Phil Swann, Shared 
Intelligence, provides a clear overview of the steps necessary to successfully 
establish a combined authority and sets out some key questions for 
consideration by councils following the Cities and Local Government 
Devolution Act (2016). 
 
This section identifies principles of good governance that could be helpful to local 
authorities as they engage in the institutional design of combined authorities and 
other forms of devolved governance.  These principles also provide a useful set of 
criteria to appraise the examples of sub-national governance set out in section 4, and 
they underpin the strategic choices set out in section 5. 
 
Principles of good governance 
 
The first point to stress is that local authorities should, themselves, decide the 
principles that they wish to use to guide the creation and governance of devolved 
arrangements.  Local authorities have a vital role to play in achieving local political 
objectives and maintaining a vibrant local democracy.  In order to be successful in 
exercising democratically accountable local leadership, councillors and officers need 
to give care and attention to institutional design.  The design of a local government 
institution can help or hinder the exercise of local leadership.  In addition, institutional 
design can influence public attitudes to local government and local governance in 
general. 
 
An early UK effort to develop principles for good local governance is provided by a 
Working Party, comprising representatives from local and central government as well 
as academe, set up in 1992.  Published in 1993 the report of the Working Party, 
‘Community Leadership and Representation: Unlocking the Potential’, identified six 
principles for the sound ‘internal management’ of local authorities17: 
 
 leadership in the community 
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 effective representation of the citizen 
 clear accountability 
 effectiveness in decision-making and implementation 
 effective scrutiny of policy and performance 
 responsiveness to local people. 
 
These principles are sound and have, on the whole, stood the test of time.  However, 
it is also the case that the role and purpose of local government has changed since 
this guidance was written, as have the expectations of citizens and other 
stakeholders.  In addition, new information technologies have transformed the 
possibilities for sharing information about trends and policy choices, and these 
technologies provide opportunities for improving the transparency of government 
institutions. 
 
While it is a simplification, it can be suggested that a major shift that has taken place 
in the last twenty years about the role of local government, a shift that can be 
captured in the phrase ‘from government to governance’:   
 
‘Government makes decisions within specific administrative and legal frameworks 
and uses public resources in a financially accountable way.  Governance, on the 
other hand, involves government plus the looser processes of influencing and 
negotiating with a range of public and private sector agencies to achieve desired 
outcomes.  A governance perspective encourages collaboration between the 
public, private, and non-profit sectors to achieve mutual goals.  There is a 
recognition here that governments cannot go it alone.’18  
 
The growth of new forms of partnership working, including the development of local 
enterprise partnerships (LEPs), points to a new public policy focus on the wellbeing 
of places rather than the performance of individual organisations.  And, of course, 
combined authorities are intended to exemplify this move to a more collaborative 
form of local governance.  
 
Taking account of this shift, the recent academic literature on sub-national 
governance, and the views of senior councillors in English local government, the 
following six principles are put forward for consideration by those designing sub-
national governance arrangements. 
 
1) Civic leadership   
 
Does the model provide for effective place-based leadership?   
 
Leadership in this context includes the capacity to develop a vision for the combined 
authority coupled with a governance arrangement that can ensure effective and 
accountable delivery of this vision.  
 
2) Considered judgement  
 
Does the model support high quality decision-making processes that go beyond 
discovering the self-interested preferences of various stakeholders?  
 
The importance of creating sound arrangements for the development of deliberative 
local democracy is difficult to overstate. 
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3) Transparency and efficiency  
 
Does the model make it crystal clear (to other councillors, professionals and the 
public at large) who is making decisions, on what issues, when, why and how? 
 
Transparency is fundamental not only in building trust and confidence in the political 
process, but also in ensuring efficiency.   
 
4) Accountability and legitimacy   
 
Does the model ensure that decision-makers are held to account?   
 
More specifically, are sound arrangements in place to ensure that there is effective 
scrutiny of decision-making by those seeking to hold the executive to account (non-
executives, the public, other parties)? 
 
5) Inclusive public involvement   
 
Does the model provide for effective public involvement in decision-making? 
 
A criticism of combined authorities is that they have a tendency to emasculate public 
debate about important public policy choices.  Processes of decision-making need to 
ensure that the voices of citizens are included. 
 
6) Inclusive business involvement  
 
Does the model provide for effective involvement of the voices of business interests?   
 
What role will local enterprise partnerships (LEPs) play in the governance 
arrangements?  How will the authority assist local businesses? 
 
From principles to strategic choices to organisational design 
 
The councillors who are charged with the creation and development of new 
arrangements for devolved governance are entering uncharted territory.  The design 
process is full of potential – there is a chance to introduce new ideas and new ways 
of governing localities stand ready to be invented.  Previous experience with local 
government innovation suggests that agreeing a set of principles of good governance 
can help members identify important strategic choices.  These, in turn, can lead to 
specific suggestions on how to design the formal structures and procedures of good 
devolved governance.  It is wise to consider principles and strategic choices before 
getting into the details of operational design.19  
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4. Exploring good governance models on the 
ground 
 
 
 
The challenges that elected local authority leaders face in the UK are, in practice, 
very similar to those faced by democratically elected local leaders in localities across 
the world.  Globalisation and the socio-economic and cultural forces embedded in 
globalisation, know no boundaries.  It follows that it is helpful to examine the 
experiences of other countries that have attempted to strengthen sub-national 
governance, and to consider what lessons might be drawn.   
 
The first point to stress is that there is no simple answer to the question: ‘How do we 
strengthen sub-national governance?’ National socio-political cultures vary. What 
might be attractive for one nation could be unacceptable for another.  However, it 
does not then follow that the UK can learn nothing from other countries.  Many 
democratic nations are actively reconsidering how to improve their sub-national 
governance arrangements, and it is clear that innovations in other countries can 
provide insights for local authority leaders and other actors in the UK. 
 
The value of ‘Innovation Stories’ 
 
There are different ways of engaging in international lesson-drawing for local 
governance.  For example, the academic literature on comparative local governance 
has expanded in recent years and this provides a good deal of useful material.  
International networks of local governments also provide valuable resources and 
facilitate learning and exchange between localities.   
 
An international book, ‘Leading the Inclusive City’, presents a new way of going 
about international lesson drawing: the Innovation Story.20 The idea of advancing 
knowledge through the documentation of case studies is well established in the 
social sciences and other academic fields.  A case study is an in depth examination 
of an individual, organisation, event, or action, existing in a specific time and place.  
Using a variety of research methods evidence is gathered in a systematic way to 
reveal new insights.  Good case studies take a long time to set up and execute, but 
they can be very illuminating. 
 
An Innovation Story is an adaptation of the case study approach.  It involves co-
constructing a short, structured narrative describing and evaluating a particular 
innovation.  It requires academics and practitioners to work together and it attempts 
to draw out lessons for others.  It takes a lot less time than a full case study. 
 
Innovation Stories relating to sub-national governance 
 
This section contains four Innovation Stories, written to a standard template, to 
expand the horizons of those involved in designing sound arrangements for devolved 
governance in England.  The examples have been chosen because they are all 
highly respected and because they highlight a range of potential options.   
 
The examples presented are: 
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 Auckland Council, New Zealand 
 
 Greater London Authority, UK 
 
 Portland Metro, Oregon, USA 
 
 Association of the Region of Stuttgart, Germany. 
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4.1 Auckland Council 
 
 
 
Key learning points 
 
 Long-established local authority boundaries were holding the city-region back. 
 
 These outdated local authority structures were reformed.  
 
 A compelling vision for the future of the city-region has been created. 
 
 The directly elected mayor model has worked well. 
 
 Special arrangements to support excluded groups can be introduced – for 
example, the Independent Māori Statutory Board (IMSB). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of the Auckland Council governance model 
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Overview 
 
In a comparatively short space of time the entire governance of Auckland has been 
transformed.  In 2010, in a radical move, the New Zealand government abolished the 
eight local authorities – seven territorial authorities and the Auckland Regional 
Council – that were then governing the wider Auckland area.  It replaced them with, 
what the press soon called, a ‘super-city’ – a new, large, unitary authority, the 
Auckland Council, which is led by a directly elected mayor.  The reform, which was 
stimulated by the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance and represents a bold 
effort to overcome the problems arising from a fragmented governance structure, has 
enabled a strategic, coordinated approach to the leadership, planning and 
management of the greater Auckland area. 
 
Auckland is New Zealand’s largest city, with its administrative region covering 
1,890 sq. miles. Its population is 1.57 million and, with 37 per cent of the country’s 
population, the city produces 35 per cent of New Zealand’s GDP. Auckland has the 
world’s largest Polynesian population, and is increasingly becoming one of the 
world’s most ethnically diverse cities, with 39 per cent of the current population born 
overseas. Its economic growth is positive at 3.7 per cent, and the city regularly ranks 
very highly on international liveability indexes. An additional 700,000 people are 
expected to make Auckland their home in the next thirty years.  The Auckland 
Council stands as a remarkable innovation in metropolitan governance, one that will 
be of interest to other cities and countries. 
 
Description 
 
1) Powers of the unit of government 
 
Set up in 2007, the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance found that 
metropolitan governance under the then existing arrangements was weak and 
fragmented, and that community involvement was poor. It recommended that the 
eight councils be replaced with a single unitary authority (responsible for both 
regional and local planning), with six subsidiary ‘local’ councils, and that the new 
council should be led by a directly elected mayor.  The government agreed with 
some, but not all, of the commission’s recommendations.  It legislated – the Local 
Government (Auckland Council) Act 2009 – for a unitary authority made up of a 
governing body of twenty councillors and a directly elected mayor, plus 21 local 
boards, with each decision-making body having complementary roles.   
 
The Auckland reforms have won international recognition, particularly the ‘One 
Mayor, One Council, One Plan’ vision for the strategic development of the metropolis.  
Regional and strategic planning, the council’s budget and regulatory functions are the 
responsibility of the governing body.  The local boards are responsible for decision-
making about local services and activities – for example, the management of parks, 
libraries, community facilities, and are responsible for identifying local community 
priorities and preferences as well as providing local input into region-wide strategies 
and plans. 
 
Significant functions of the new council were given to a number of council controlled 
organisations (CCOs) with appointed boards of directors, including transport, water 
and wastewater, economic development, facilities management and urban 
development.  
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The CCOs operate separately, but are accountable to the governing body, which sets 
their direction and monitors their performance via Statements of Intent, letters of 
expectation to the boards, making of board appointments and a monitoring and 
reporting regime. 
 
Auckland Council is the largest council in Australasia, with a £1.7 billion ($3.5 billion 
NZD) annual operating budget, £20 billion ($42 billion NZD) of assets and 
approximately 11,000 staff (council group). The council’s (including CCOs) largest 
single source of revenue is rates (a property tax), representing 41 per cent of total 
revenue. In addition to rates, the group also has many different types of revenue 
streams, totalling £987 million ($2,100 million NZD), which represents 59 per cent of 
total revenue. In 2015, the largest components were grants of £200 million ($425 
million NZD), sourced primarily from government, mainly for land transport, and 
revenue from water and wastewater services totally £196 million ($418 million NZD). 
Other revenue streams include dividends from council-owned companies and shares, 
development contributions towards the cost of infrastructure and a wide range of fees 
and charges. 
 
Some of the general powers enjoyed by the Auckland Council are set out in previous 
local government Acts affecting all local authorities in New Zealand.  However, the 
2009 Act spells out a number of specific functions and requirements relating to the 
Auckland Council – for example, the development of a thirty year spatial plan for 
Auckland, the establishment of Auckland Transport and its governance structure and 
responsibilities, and the consolidation of wholesale and retail water and wastewater 
supply into a single entity.  The Act also provides for the creation of an Independent 
Māori Statutory Board, which ensures there is a voice for Māori (New Zealand’s 
indigenous people) in the governance of Auckland, and to assist in meeting its 
statutory obligations in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi 1840.   
 
Local government in New Zealand does not manage schools or social services and is 
not required to provide social housing, although Auckland Council does provide a 
limited stock of pensioner housing. 
 
2) Election arrangements for those serving in governance 
 
Local government elections in New Zealand are triennial, using postal voting. Voter 
turnout in local government elections across New Zealand is not regarded as high, 
with a 42 per cent turnout in 2013, falling from 57 per cent in 1989.  At the first 
elections to the Auckland Council in 2010 voter turnout was 51 per cent but in 2013 
this figure had dropped to 36 per cent.  Councils may elect to use preferential voting 
systems, but Auckland Council has retained the ‘first past the post’ system, meaning 
candidates must win 50 per cent plus one of the votes cast to win office.  
 
The governing body of the council comprises twenty councillors from 13 wards, plus 
the Mayor. The 21 elected local boards have between five and nine members (149 in 
total). The Mayor has some executive powers – he/she appoints the Deputy Mayor, 
establishes the committees of the governing body, appoints their chairs and he/she 
chairs the governing body itself.  
 
The Mayor also has a statutory responsibility to:  
 promote a vision for Auckland 
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 provide leadership to achieve this vision 
 lead the development of region-wide council plans, policies and budgets 
 ensure the council engages effectively with all Aucklanders. 
Local elections in Auckland next take place in October 2016. 
 
3) The executive governance arrangements 
 
All Auckland Council powers are vested in the Auckland Council.  The directly 
elected mayor has a very high public profile and is very influential in the governance 
of the metropolis but, in practice, he or she has comparatively few executive powers.  
The Mayor proposes the budget, for example, but still requires majority support to 
have it adopted by the governing body.  
 
There is also a statutory provision for the mayor to establish a mayoral office, with a 
minimum budget of 0.2 per cent of the council’s annual operating budget. This office 
supports the Mayor in carrying out his or her statutory roles of leading policy 
development, council plans and budgets, and assists the Mayor in ensuring the 
council engages with the people of Auckland. 
 
Executive authority is delegated from the council to the chief executive who is 
appointed by the governing body. As in UK local government the chief executive is a 
professional officer who is appointed on merit.  There are limits to the amount of 
authority that can be delegated in relation to spending decisions.  The chief executive 
appoints and employs all staff of the council organisation, but not the staff of the 
council controlled organisations (CCOs). 
 
4) The scrutiny arrangements 
 
The New Zealand controller and auditor-general is an officer of Parliament. His or her 
mandate and responsibilities are set out in the Public Audit Act 2001.  All local 
authorities are accountable to the public for the activities they fund through locally 
raised revenue. As an officer of Parliament, the auditor-general provides this 
independent assurance to both Parliament and the public. Since 2006, the auditor-
general has had a statutory duty to issue opinions on local authorities' long-term 
plans, that is, their ten-year budgets. 
 
Moving to the scrutiny arrangements within the Auckland Council itself, there is a 
committee of the council responsible for reviewing the performance of the chief 
executive on a quarterly basis. This committee reviews performance and makes 
recommendations to the council.  Delegations of authority – for example, financial, 
regulatory, legal, employment – by the council to the chief executive, and by the chief 
executive to different levels of staff, are detailed extensively in a delegations register. 
There is also currently an Audit and Risk Committee and CCO Governance and 
Monitoring Committee, although the committee structure is determined by the Mayor 
of the day. 
 
When decision-making is to be made by elected members at committee meetings, 
rather than through delegated powers to the executive, a simple majority is required 
to either accept or reject the recommendations of staff. Decision-making by elected 
representatives is generally conducted in public, unless there are demonstrable 
grounds for confidentiality.  
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Evaluative commentary 
 
1) Civic leadership 
 
Auckland Council was designed to balance effective regional governance with 
responsive local decision-making on matters that are purely local in impact. There 
are provisions in the council’s enabling legislation that set out the respective 
decision-making responsibilities of the council and the local boards.  The governing 
body and the local boards are responsible, and democratically accountable, for the 
decision-making of the Auckland Council as a whole. The Mayor has a specific role, 
also in statute, relating to the development of council plans and articulating and 
promoting a vision for Auckland. The ‘One Mayor, Once Council, One Plan’ strategy 
has been praised for providing a coherent and compelling vision for the metropolis.  
The local boards provide a vehicle for place-based leadership of different 
communities in Auckland. 
 
2) Considered judgement 
 
The design of this model of governance is intended to ensure all voices are 
represented in the decision-making process, especially in relation to metropolitan-
wide issues.  Initially, the government considered having some or all of the 
councillors elected at large, rather than representing wards, as a way of minimising 
the risk of parochialism at the regional level. However, this was not progressed.   
 
The model provides for strong strategic leadership by the directly elected mayor, 
coupled with responsiveness to localities within the metropolis via the network of 
local boards.  Naturally there are conflicts of view on policy and priorities.  For 
example, the council was recently required to develop a local alcohol policy under the 
Sale and Supply of Liquor Act. Some local boards had strong views on limiting liquor 
outlets at the very local level, while the governing body took the approach of creating 
three broad zones of categorisation. The desire of local boards to have direct input 
into land use planning decisions was also contested early on in the new structure, 
with a compromise being reached within the regulatory framework after considerable 
debate. On the whole these conflicts have been resolved through deliberation and 
discussion. 
 
3) Transparency and efficiency 
 
Meetings of Auckland Council are held in public, as are the meetings of local boards.  
Roles and responsibilities are explicit and are set out clearly on the Auckland Council 
website.  However, one of the criticisms of the amalgamation has been that it is 
difficult for the public, and firms, to navigate multiple, complex planning and decision-
making structures. Areas where this has proved especially challenging include 
development projects, where decisions are made by: a range of CCOs (water, 
wastewater, transport) on infrastructure, local boards on local social infrastructure 
(parks, libraries, community facilities) and the governing body on land use planning.  
Significant efforts have been made over the past six years to develop a more co-
ordinated approach to infrastructure planning and the release of land for 
development, including the development of a single land-use planning document for 
all Auckland (the Unitary Plan).   
The development of the Unitary Plan is a process where stakeholder interests are 
highly visible and vocal. This has been mitigated by the establishment of an 
Learning lessons from international models of sub-national governance 24 
Independent Hearings Panel, headed by an Environment Court judge, to hear 
submissions on the draft plan and make recommendations to the council.  
 
4) Accountability and legitimacy 
 
As with any elected representative structure, accountability is ultimately through the 
ballot box, with elections taking place once every three years.  In addition, New 
Zealand has well-established arrangements for local government audit and 
monitoring. 
 
The governance structure is perceived by some Aucklanders as putting ‘too much 
power’ in the hands of unelected boards.  It is true that the boards of the council 
controlled organisations (CCOs) are important actors in the governance of the 
metropolitan area.  However, the accountability arrangements for these CCOs are 
robust and specific provisions were made in the Local Government (Auckland 
Council) Act 2009 to strengthen the accountability requirements for Auckland CCOs 
(sections 91-95). 
 
Another controversial feature of the Auckland Council has been the inclusion of the 
Independent Māori Statutory Board (IMSB) in the governance structure, which was 
legislated for at the amalgamation. The Royal Commission had proposed that two 
seats on the Auckland Council be declared Māori seats (similar to the New Zealand 
parliamentary arrangements). This idea was rejected and the board was created as a 
political compromise between opposing parties within the coalition government of the 
day.  
 
The board has nine members selected by a body representative of local Māori. The 
board is required to appoint two members to sit on the council committees that deal 
with management and stewardship of natural and physical resources. The current 
administration has also invited members of the IMSB to sit on a range of other 
committees, where they have the same input into decision-making as elected 
members. 
 
5) Inclusive public involvement  
 
Auckland Council has made particular efforts to engage with the public in its 
decision-making processes. In fact, effective public engagement is a statutory 
responsibility of the Mayor. The metropolitan and local decision-making structure 
enables engagement on issues of region-wide significance (long term financial plan, 
land use planning, spatial planning) as well as on discrete local issues (design of new 
social infrastructure such as libraries and parks, opening hours of community 
facilities, local grant making to community groups).  
 
6) Inclusive business involvement 
 
The council is currently served by a number of advisory panels representing various 
interest groups and communities in Auckland – for example, a Youth Advisory Panel, 
a Seniors Advisory Panel, a Disability Advisory Panel and the Independent Māori 
Statutory Board.  In addition, a Business Leadership Group has been established to 
ensure a stronger working relationship between the council and the business sector. 
The business community has been largely positive about the amalgamation, 
especially its ability to deal with one council, with one voice. The council has had a 
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strong focus on being business friendly, with a key account management approach 
being put in place for larger consenting customers, which creates a single point of 
contact across all parts of the council group. There is also a strong focus on business 
attraction, especially internationally, through the council’s economic development 
agency. 
 
Sources 
 
Auckland Council: www.aucklandcouncil.govt.nz 
 
Hambleton R. (2015) Leading the Inclusive City. Place-based innovation for a 
bounded planet. pp 188-192. Bristol: Policy Press. 
 
McFarlane K., Solomon R. and Memon A. (2015) ‘Designing institutions for strategic 
spatial planning: Auckland’s governance reforms’, Urban Policy and Research, Vol 
33, No 4, pp 452-471. 
 
Royal Commission on Auckland Governance (2009) Auckland Governance Report. 
Auckland, New Zealand: Royal Commission on Auckland Governance. 
www.royalcommission.govt.nz 
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4.2 Greater London Authority 
 
 
 
Key learning points 
 
 First ever directly elected mayor in UK local government – an idea opposed 
by many in 1999 but now well established. 
 
 A strategic metropolitan authority with the London boroughs continuing to 
provide most local government services. 
 
 Introduction of a congestion charge in 2003 regarded as a very successful 
innovation at home and abroad. 
 
 Very high level of visibility for the directly elected mayor. 
 
 Important scrutiny role for the London Assembly. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Overview of the Greater London Authority governance model 
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Overview 
 
The Greater London Authority (GLA), a strategic metropolitan authority created by 
the Greater London Authority Act 1999, serves a population of 8.6 million and has 
over 800 staff.  It has a mayor-council form of government in which there is a 
separation of powers between the executive (the directly elected mayor) and the 25-
member London Assembly, which scrutinises the Mayor and holds him or her to 
account.  The ‘principal purposes’ of the GLA are to promote economic development, 
wealth creation, social development and environmental improvement in London.  It 
has powers over transport, policing, strategic spatial planning, housing, economic 
development, and fire and emergency planning.   
 
Below the level of the GLA the 32 London boroughs and the City of London continue 
to provide the majority of local government services.  To promote coordination 
between borough level service-delivery and pan-London policy-making there is a 
range of largely non-statutory partnership boards in place.  These operate under the 
auspices of a Congress comprising the Mayor and the leaders of the London 
boroughs. 
 
In 2000, Ken Livingstone, when he was elected Mayor of London, became the first 
directly elected executive politician in UK history.  While some, in English local 
government, opposed the idea of a mayor-council model of governance, believing it 
to be unsuited to British politics, the evidence suggests that the GLA has worked 
relatively well.  For example, city leaders in other countries view the introduction, in 
2003, of a congestion charge on vehicles entering the central area of the capital as a 
successful environmental measure that they would wish to emulate, and it is clear 
that mayoral leadership brought about this breakthrough. 
 
Description 
 
1) Powers of the Greater London Authority (GLA) 
 
The GLA is a strategic metropolitan authority with powers over transport, policing, 
strategic spatial planning, housing, economic development, and fire and emergency 
planning.  The planning policies of the Mayor of London are detailed in a statutory 
London Plan that is regularly examined in public, updated and published.  The GLA 
was not originally set up to directly provide services itself.  Instead, three functional 
bodies carry out most of the work under the policy direction of the Mayor and the 
Assembly.  These are:  
 
 Transport for London (TfL) – covering public transport, main roads, traffic 
management and administration of the congestion charge 
 
 Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) – overseeing the 
Metropolitan Police service  
 
 the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) – administering 
the London Fire Brigade and coordinating emergency planning.  (Note, at the 
time of writing this body due to be with effect from April 2017, with the 
functions will be brought into the GLA). 
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Since its establishment in 2000 the GLA has evolved and expanded its role, both 
through the actions of respective mayors and partly because of legislation.  The 
focus of the organisation has shifted from primarily policy formation to a greater 
emphasis on direct responsibility for delivery of outcomes, particularly around 
housing and land.  For example, the Localism Act 2011 provided the Mayor with 
powers to establish Mayoral Development Corporations and there are now two – the 
London Legacy Development Corporation (on the site of the London Olympics) and 
the Old Oak and Park Royal Development Corporation.  
 
The total budget of the GLA Group in 2016/17 is £15.9 billion, comprising a revenue 
budget of £11.1 billion and a capital budget of £4.8 billion. The budget provides for 
some £800 million to be raised from council tax precept income.  Other sources of 
income include fares, charges, government grants and an element of retained 
business rates income. 
 
At the time of writing, discussions are ongoing regarding the devolution of further 
powers to the GLA and/or the GLA working in concert with the London boroughs.  
For example, the Government has announced its intention to pilot 100 per cent 
retention of business rates in London from 2017.  This will likely have implications for 
joint governance arrangements between the GLA and the boroughs.  
 
2) Election arrangements for those serving in governance 
 
Elections for the Mayor of London and for the London Assembly take place at the 
same time once every four years.  Voters receive three ballot papers: one to vote for 
the Mayor of London and two for the London Assembly.  The voting system for the 
Mayor is the supplementary vote: voters are asked to express a first and a second 
preference.  If no candidate wins more than 50 per cent of the first choices the top 
two candidates go through to a second round of counting.  The second preferences 
of voters have influenced the outcome in all five London Mayoral elections.  
 
In relation to the London Assembly elections voters have two votes: one for their 
constituency Assembly Member (representing their geographical area within 
London); and one for a London-wide Member.  Fourteen members represent 
constituencies and eleven members represent the whole of the capital.  In the GLA 
elections held in May 2012 the voter turnout was 38.8 per cent, a figure that is very 
close to the turnout of 38.9 per cent in local elections held for the London boroughs 
and the City of London in May 2014.  In 2016 the voter turnout for the GLA election 
was 45 per cent. 
 
3) The executive governance arrangements 
  
The Mayor has an important convening power and a very high public profile.  In 
addition, the Mayor has a number of formal executive powers relating to: the budget; 
policy; and appointments of senior staff (that is, mayoral advisers, but not senior 
officers).  In addition, the Mayor also has a substantial influence over the work of the 
GLA Group of agencies although, in practice, day-to-day leadership is delegated to 
deputy mayors.  However, the Mayor is not a free agent.  He or she needs to listen to 
and respond, to some extent at least, to the London Assembly and the voices of 
other stakeholders.   
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For example, the Mayor sets the GLA budget.  But, while this has not happened to 
date, if the London Assembly could achieve a two-thirds majority in favour of an 
alternative budget the assembly’s budget would prevail.  The Assembly cannot veto 
mayoral proposals. 
 
4) The scrutiny arrangements 
 
The London Assembly holds the Mayor and mayoral advisers to account by publicly 
examining GLA policies and programmes through committee meetings, plenary 
sessions, site visits and investigations.  The Mayor has a statutory duty to consult the 
assembly on a number of strategies and functions.  In addition, the assembly 
questions the Mayor ten times a year at public Mayor’s Question Time meetings.  
The Mayor must also consult Assembly Members before producing statutory 
strategies and the multi-billion pound budget for the GLA Group.  Assembly meetings 
are open to the public.  The Greater London Act 2007 gave the Assembly the power 
to hold confirmation hearings for specified mayoral appointments. 
 
Twice a year, the Mayor and the Assembly Members hold a ‘People’s Question Time’ 
where members of the public can raise questions relating to the Mayor’s statutory 
functions. These are held in large venues, attracting up to 1,000 residents and have 
been located across London.  The Assembly’s meetings regularly include an ‘open 
microphone’ element whereby particular interest groups can address the meeting.  
Interest groups that have featured in recent meetings include cyclists, gypsies and 
travellers, and the deaf community.  
 
Evaluative commentary 
 
1) Civic leadership 
 
There is no doubt that the GLA model of metropolitan governance underpins very 
high profile city leadership.  In the years since the creation of the Mayor and 
Assembly in 2000 London’s national and international profile has been enhanced 
enormously.  The directly elected mayoral model has meant that the first two mayors 
of Greater London – Ken Livingstone (2000-08) and Boris Johnson (2008-16) – are 
now not just household names in the UK, but also well-known political leaders on the 
international stage. Successes, such as attracting the Olympics and securing funding 
for Crossrail, are unlikely to have happened in the absence of a directly elected 
champion for the city. In addition, the London Assembly has provided a platform for 
civic leadership.  Assembly Members have championed a range of issues on behalf 
of Londoners and have made a significant policy impact in areas such as air quality, 
transparency of the GLA Group, rail devolution and the smoking ban.  
 
2) Considered judgement 
 
The rules and guidelines developed by the GLA relating to procedures and decision-
making are extensive.  There are a large number of protocols and requirements 
relating to, for example, ethics, competency, codes of conduct, and whistle-blowing, 
and these are openly presented on the GLA website.  Naturally there are conflicting 
views on policies and priorities and sometimes these conflicts are intense.  For 
example, the GLA Oversight Committee has examined the procurement of the 
Garden Bridge design contract and made a number of strong criticisms of the Mayor 
and Transport for London.   
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3) Transparency and efficiency 
 
The model of governance is clearly set out on the GLA website and the GLA 
operates with a high level of transparency when compared with other parts of the 
public sector.  Roles and responsibilities are explicit and London Assembly meetings 
and Mayor’s Question Time meetings are conducted in public.  However, Assembly 
Members on the GLA Oversight Committee have expressed concerns about the lack 
of transparency in the working arrangements for parts of the GLA Group.  They have 
now carried out two reviews of transparency in the organisation of GLA business (in 
2013 and in 2016) and have concluded that, while progress has been made in 
improving openness, transparency is not all that it should be.  They have made 
recommendations for improving transparency, notably in the Mayor’s Office for 
Policing and Crime. 
 
4) Accountability and legitimacy 
 
The process of direct election of the Mayor and Members of the London Assembly 
ensures that political representatives are held to account at the ballot box.  This is an 
important strength of the GLA model of governance.  All those elected to serve the 
GLA are held to account in open, fair and free elections.  In addition, the separation 
of powers between the executive (the Mayor) and the London Assembly is intended 
to ensure that the Mayor is held to account.  However, some believe that the scrutiny 
arrangements are blurred and that this weakens accountability.  For example, some 
Assembly Members play roles in the mayoral team. 
 
5) Inclusive public involvement 
 
Reference is made above to the opportunities members of the public have to observe 
GLA decision-making as it takes place, and to contribute their views at ‘People’s 
Question Time’ meetings.  In addition, London Assembly Members play a vital role in 
representing the views of citizens to the Mayor and mayoral advisers.  Assembly 
Members receive a large a number of questions and suggestions from their 
constituents, carry out a lot of site visits, and ask questions at Mayor’s Question Time 
meetings about concerns that have been put to them.  Many of the scrutiny 
investigations carried out by the London Assembly focus on issues that would, 
otherwise, be neglected – for example, making the transport network better for those 
with sensory impairment.  
 
6) Inclusive business involvement 
 
The GLA is very active in collaborating with business interests to promote London 
internationally and to promote economic development and economic opportunity 
within London.  The local enterprise partnership for London, the London Enterprise 
Panel, which is chaired by the Mayor, focuses on regeneration, employment and the 
skills agenda for London.  It runs the London Growth Hub, a one-stop shop providing 
a range of support services to London businesses, and has working groups on small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and on digital/creative/science and 
technological innovation.  Other efforts to include business voices in the governance 
of London include the Smart London Board, which brings together business leaders 
and academics to advise the Mayor on how to use digital technologies for the benefit 
of London, and the London Food Board, which advises the Mayor on food strategy 
for London. 
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4.3 Portland Metro Region 
 
 
 
Key learning points 
 
 Bold reforms in 1978 created a metropolitan level of government above the 
level of the existing municipalities. 
 
 No directly elected executive mayor.   
 
 A directly elected president, who does not have independent powers, works 
closely with the six directly elected councillors. 
 
 A directly elected Metro auditor provides independent scrutiny. 
 
 High level of transparency and strong public involvement. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Overview of the Portland Metro governance model 
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Overview 
 
Voters approved the creation of a regional government, the ‘Metropolitan Service 
District’, to serve the Portland metropolitan area in 1978.  The origins of this, the first 
directly elected regional government in the USA, can be traced to the 1950s when a 
Metropolitan Planning Commission was set up to promote effective regional planning.  
Metro now serves more than 1.8 million people within Clackamas, Multnomah and 
Washington counties, and the agency’s boundary encompasses Portland, Oregon 
and 25 other cities, although not the most distant rural areas of those counties.  The 
Metro Council comprises a President, directly elected region-wide, and six 
councillors, who are elected by district every four years in nonpartisan races.  The 
Metro auditor, elected region-wide is responsible for oversight of Metro’s financial 
affairs and for conducting performance audits.  Metro is widely recognised as a highly 
successful model of regional governance in the USA, a country where metropolitan 
governance is, on the whole, not well developed.  
 
Description 
 
1) Powers of Metro 
 
The core purposes of Metro are to provide region-wide land use and transportation 
planning and to manage growth, infrastructure and development issues that cut 
across jurisdictional boundaries.  Metro manages and controls certain aspects of 
urban development, consistent with Oregon state-wide land use planning law, in 
order to protect farms, forests and the natural environment, and it works with local 
partners to conserve historic neighbourhoods, spur economic development and 
accommodate growth.  Metro serves as the metropolitan planning organisation 
(MPO) for Transportation, and enables the region to meet Federal and State 
transportation planning requirements for the three-county area.  In addition, Metro 
runs various regional attractions, for example, the Oregon Zoo and Oregon 
Convention Centre, manages 17,000 acres of parks, trails and natural areas, and 
oversees the region’s solid waste system.  A key function of Metro is to determine the 
‘urban growth boundary’ and to set out a vision for the future of the area.  Adopted by 
Metro in 2008 the current vision – ‘Our Place in the World’ – sets out an ambitious 
and detailed strategy for the area. 
 
Metro employs 1,600 employees, including park rangers, economists and planners.  
Current revenues for Metro in fiscal year 2015/16 were budgeted at £255 million 
($370 million USD).  Forty percent – or nearly £101 million ($147 million USD) – are 
enterprise revenues generated by Metro’s activities, especially for solid waste and 
from visitor venues.  Metro budgeted £41 million ($59 million USD) in local property 
taxes and £14 million ($21 million USD) in excise taxes.  About 11 per cent of Metro’s 
revenues are from federal, state, and other local government transfers.  The 
remaining earnings are from interest earnings and bond sales.  
 
2) Election arrangements for those serving in governance 
 
Elections employ a ‘first past the post’ system, that is elected officials at Metro must 
win at least 50 per cent plus one of the votes cast to win office. The President of 
Metro is directly elected, as is the Metro auditor, and they both serve a four-year 
term.   
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The six councillors, elected to represent geographical districts in the Metro area, also 
serve four-year terms.  Elections take place for all positions at the same time. 
Elections are staggered so that, basically, half the council gets elected every two 
years. The voter turnout at the last Metro elections in 2014 was 40 per cent.  This 
compares with an average voter turnout in Oregon local elections of around 35 per 
cent to 58 per cent.  Since Metro was created in 1978 voter turnout has varied widely 
depending on how contested the election is by strong candidates.  The highest voter 
turnout for Metro was 70 per cent in 2010.  On that occasion there were two strong 
candidates running for council President. 
 
3) The executive governance arrangements 
  
All Metro powers are vested in the Metro Council, which has seven members:  the 
directly elected President, who presides over the council, and the six councillors.  
The President appoints all members of the committees, commissions and boards 
created by the council, and is enormously influential.  However, the President does 
not have powers that are independent of the council, as happens, for example, with 
some directly elected mayoral models of governance.  The council meets regularly in 
meetings that are open to the public.  As a general rule the agreement of the majority 
of councillors present, and constituting a quorum, is necessary to make council 
decisions.  
 
The Metro Council President is a full time position, and the Metro Council positions 
are considered one-third time.  Salaries for the council President and councillors are 
pegged to the salaries for Oregon circuit court judges. 
 
The Metro Council appoints two officials: the chief operating officer and the Metro 
attorney.  The chief operating officer is responsible for the day-to-day operations of 
Metro and hiring all of the employees (except for the Metro attorney and Metro 
auditor).  The Metro attorney handles all litigation on behalf of the agency.   
 
Metro may impose, levy and collect taxes and can issue bonds.  Any broad-based 
taxes of general applicability on, say, income, property or sales, requires the 
approval of the voters of Metro before taking effect. 
 
Metro has a strong track record of open meetings and public involvement in decision-
making.  For example, the agency has adopted policies for open meetings and public 
engagement that incorporate, and go beyond, the requirements of federal and state 
governments (of which there are many).  The principles that guide Metro’s public 
participation practices are embodied in the ‘Public Engagement Guide’ adopted by 
the Metro Council in November 2013.  In general, the agency has adapted many new 
practices that reflect the way that people in the 21st century work with governments.  
The agency has also adopted practices designed to get input from disadvantaged 
residents who often do not participate in traditional meetings or open houses.  
 
4) The scrutiny arrangements 
 
The directly elected Metro auditor serves full time and may not be employed by any 
other person or entity while serving as auditor.  The auditor is empowered to make 
continuous investigations of the operations of Metro, including financial and 
performance auditing.  
 
Learning lessons from international models of sub-national governance 35 
The auditor does not perform any executive function.  Rather he or she provides an 
important scrutiny role and can make published reports to the Metro Council on any 
matter relating to the performance of the organisation, and provide recommendations 
for remedial action.  There is a complete separation of powers between the executive 
and the scrutiny functions. 
 
In addition to the reports from the auditor, Metro publishes quarterly management 
reports.  The final report for each year includes a ‘balanced scorecard’. The balanced 
scorecard views the organisation from six distinct perspectives: financial 
performance, internal and external customer service, business process efficiency, 
employee learning and growth, sustainability and diversity. Up to five years of data 
are provided for each measure. 
 
Evaluative commentary 
 
1) Civic leadership 
 
It is clear that the Metro model of governance underpins highly visible political 
leadership of the metropolitan area.  The process of direct election ensures that the 
President is a visible and well-known public figure.  However, unlike in a directly 
elected mayor model of governance, the President does not have personal authority 
to take executive decisions.  Rather the councillors also play an important civic 
leadership role.  While the President is ‘first among equals’ the senior political 
leadership of Metro is collective: the seven members of Metro Council share the 
political leadership task.  This does not diminish the power of Metro to exercise 
effective, place-based leadership for the metropolitan area.  Note that Metro does not 
have a directly elected mayor. 
 
The awareness of the natural environment and the qualities of the place are highly 
developed within the political culture of Oregon.  Citizens are, on the whole, very 
concerned about the natural environment and understanding of the ecological 
challenges facing the planet is advanced.  It follows that, as a general rule, the 
citizens of the Metro area are committed to protecting the quality of the environment 
and to ensuring that their place is well managed.  These cultural values, and the 
political support of activists, influence public discourse and there is strong support in 
the population for the green agenda.  However, this is not to the exclusion of other 
concerns.  As in other city regions, there are conflicts between those anxious to 
ensure the implementation of the strategic management of urban growth, and local 
interests that, at times, favour a variety of urban development projects for economic 
reasons. 
 
2) Considered judgement 
 
People in the Greater Portland area are civically active and the local political culture 
places a high value on public participation.  To enjoy public support decisions made 
by the Metro Council need to be sensitive to this political context.  The fact that high-
level decisions have to be agreed by a majority of the Metro Council ensures that 
perspectives of different localities are presented and recorded.  Naturally, there are 
conflicts of view on policy and priorities but these are usually resolved through 
deliberation and discussion. 
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Metro’s strength in this area is that its primary responsibilities in all of its functional 
areas (with the possible exception of the Oregon Zoo and the Oregon Convention 
Centre) require the agency to be focused on the major, long-term threats and 
opportunities that face the region.  This enables Metro to ensure that many voices 
and perspectives are considered before taking final actions. 
 
3) Transparency and efficiency 
 
The model of governance is clearly set out in the Metro Charter.  Roles and 
responsibilities are explicit and the conduct of Metro business in public Metro 
meetings means that the model has a high level of transparency.  The independent, 
directly elected Metro auditor provides a check on the activities of Metro Council.  
This individual has the legitimacy and resources to examine issues relating to 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
4) Accountability and legitimacy 
 
The President, the councillors and the auditor are all answerable to the citizenry at 
the ballot box.  Other candidates for office can and do stand, and these positions are 
often contested.  All those elected to serve on the Metro enjoy the legitimacy of direct 
election, and they are held to account in open, fair and free elections.  In addition, the 
separation of powers between the Metro Council and the auditor means that the 
Metro auditor can provide an independent, third party review of the effectiveness of 
the agency.   
 
5) Inclusive public involvement 
 
Metro has extensive arrangements for public involvement.  These arrangements are 
set out in an excellent paper, a ‘Public Engagement Guide’, published in 2013.  This 
guide will be of interest to any sub-national government that wishes to provide clear 
and accessible information on decision-making.  It is designed to assist community 
members who want to engage with Metro, staff seeking useful ideas and federal 
agencies wanting to verify compliance with legal requirements. 
 
6) Inclusive business involvement 
 
The business community is effective in engaging with Metro on issues where there is 
a clear link to business, economic development, and employment.  In particular, 
Metro has active relationships with business in issues around land use and 
development, transportation planning and funding, and solid waste regulations and 
operations. 
 
Sources 
 
Abbott C and Abbott M. P. (1991) A history of Metro. Portland, Oregon: Metro 
Regional Government. 
 
Cotugno A. and Seltzer E. (2011) ‘Towards a metropolitan consciousness in the 
Portland Oregon metropolitan area’, International Planning Studies, Vol 16, No 3, pp 
289-304. 
 
Metro website: www.oregonmetro.gov 
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Metro (2008) Our Place in the World. Global challenges. Regional strategies. 
Homegrown solutions. Portland, Oregon: Metro. 
 
Metro (2013) Public Engagement Guide. Portland, Oregon: Metro. 
http://www.oregonmetro.gov/public-engagement-guide  
 
Ozawa C. P. (ed) (2004) The Portland Edge: Challenges and successes in growing 
communities. Washington DC: Island Press. 
 
State of Oregon (2015) Metro Charter. People, places, open spaces. Effective 8 
January 2015.  Portland, Oregon: Metro Regional Government. 
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4.4 Association of the Region of Stuttgart 
 
 
 
Key learning points 
 
 Directly elected regional governance introduced in 1984. 
 
 Existing municipalities remain.  
 
 No directly elected mayor. 
 
 The members of the Assembly appoint the Chair of the Assembly from their 
own ranks. 
 
 Particularly strong business involvement. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Overview of the Association of the Region of Stuttgart governance 
model 
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Overview 
 
Established in 1994 the new region of Stuttgart is one of the first successful efforts at 
metropolitan reform in Germany.  A relatively ineffective regional planning 
association was replaced by a new, directly elected system of regional governance: 
the Verband Region of Stuttgart (VRS).  The VRS is responsible for regional spatial 
planning, landscape framework planning, regional transport planning, economic 
development and parts of waste management.  The metropolitan region, which has a 
population of 2.6 million, encompasses 179 municipalities, five counties and the city 
of Stuttgart.  The core city, with 550,000 residents, is surrounded by several medium-
sized cities, and there is a high level of commuting from the surrounding areas into 
Stuttgart and the other cities. 
 
Citizens elect an 87-member regional assembly and a wide range of political parties 
are represented.  The assembly appoints a chair from its ranks to lead the assembly 
for a five-year term.  The VRS employs a relatively small team of fifty staff and has a 
budget of £226 million (€290 million).  The VRS works closely with the city of 
Stuttgart, the counties and the municipalities.  While there will always be conflicts of 
view on the location of particular developments, the VRS enjoys a relatively high 
level of support from the local authorities.  Most of the smaller communities recognise 
the benefits that are to be gained from being part of a strategic authority.  The VRS 
has been particularly effective in helping to build new regional networks for 
entrepreneurs and those active in the creative industries.  It has also been active on 
the international stage – the VRS was the first region in Germany to establish an 
office in Brussels in 2002 and is an active member of the European Network of 
Metropolitan Regions (METREX). 
 
Description 
 
1) Powers of the unit of government 
 
In the German planning system regional plans provide a link between spatial and 
economic goals developed at the Land (or state) level and the land use plans 
devised by municipalities at the local level. In 1972 the Land of Baden-
Wuerttemberg, in Southern Germany, established twelve regional associations for 
which regional plans had to be developed by law.  One of the twelve regions was the 
Mid-Neckar Region. It comprised five counties and the city of Stuttgart.  However, 
this planning association lacked the powers to tackle the challenges facing the 
region.  In particular, because many residents and businesses were moving to 
suburban municipalities, the city of Stuttgart encountered serious fiscal problems.  
The economic crisis of the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, which led to 
massive job losses in the automotive industry in the area, spurred leaders at the 
Land and local level to adopt a more radical approach. 
 
In 1994, the relatively ineffective regional planning association was replaced with a 
new kind of elected regional governance: the Verband Region Stuttgart (VRS).  The 
VRS is responsible for the following tasks: 
 
 comprehensive regional planning including setting a mandatory framework for 
local land use plans (the VRS defines where and how much land can be 
zoned for further development for housing, commercial and retail 
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development, protected open space and so on; the municipalities remain 
responsible for deciding on detailed planning permission) 
 landscape framework planning (covering, for example, land, water and 
climate change mitigation) 
 the development of a ‘landscape park’ – a programme to improve the quality 
of open spaces for recreational purposes 
 regional transport planning and regional public transit (including regional 
railways, metro busses, park and ride facilities and traffic management) 
 parts of waste management  
 regional economic development and tourism marketing. 
 
In addition, the VRS has the right to voluntarily take on tasks in the fields of culture, 
sports, events and trade fairs at the regional scale. 
 
The annual budget of the VRS is £225 million (€290 million).  The funding comes 
from a diversity of sources: a contribution from the Land of Baden-Wuerttemberg, 
three different levies (association, transport, waste) from its member communities, 
income from running the regional rail system (the S-Bahn), as well as project funding 
for which the VRS applies regularly to higher levels of government, the EU and to 
private sector sponsors. 
 
2) Election arrangements for those serving in governance 
 
The VRS has a directly elected regional assembly.  Representation for the 87 seats 
in the regional assembly is related to the population sizes of the five counties and the 
city of Stuttgart.  A wide range of political parties is represented and no one party has 
overall control.  The individuals elected to the assembly include professionals, 
interested citizens as well as local authority mayors and county councillors. 
 
Citizens of the region, meaning those aged 16 years and above, elect the regional 
assembly once every five years.  The elections use a system of proportional 
representation (involving lists of candidates).  The law requires the assembly to 
comprise a minimum of 80 and a maximum of 96 members.  The existence of the 16 
flexible seats ensures that the results of the election reflect the level of support for 
the lists within election districts and within the region as a whole.  Elected councillors 
do not represent a county, municipality or any other geographical constituency.  
Rather they are elected to represent the region as a whole.  All those elected to 
serve, including the Chair, are part time politicians.  The voter turnout at the last 
elections to the VRS in 2014 was 53 per cent, almost exactly the same as in 2009.  It 
should be noted that the elections for the regional assembly take place at the same 
time as the elections for the other local councils and for the European Union. 
 
3) The executive governance arrangements 
 
The Chair of the assembly, who is chosen by the members of the assembly, has an 
important leadership role but has little independent executive power.  He or she 
prepares the agendas for the assembly meetings, and also the agendas for the three 
committees: Economy, infrastructure and administration; Transport and mobility; and, 
Planning.  The assembly meets five or six times a year. The committees may make 
decisions on minor issues, but their main role is to prepare policy papers for decision 
by the assembly. The assembly decides the policies of the association and also sets 
the budget. 
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The Chair proposes the executive director of the association and the assembly 
appoints this person for a period of eight years.  The executive director leads the 
administration, represents the association and implements the decisions of the 
assembly.  He or she participates in the work of the assembly, including the three 
committees, acting as an adviser. 
 
4) The scrutiny arrangements 
 
The work of the administration is under the political control of the assembly.  The 
executive director and the officers of the association are held to account by the 
assembly.  The Land of Baden-Wuerttemberg ensures the work of the association 
complies with the law. 
 
Evaluative commentary 
 
1) Civic leadership 
 
The VRS model of government provides high profile and visible leadership for the 
region of Stuttgart.  The organisational design balances leadership at the level of the 
region with leadership at lower geographical levels.  A key strength of the VRS model 
is that, unlike most regional governance arrangements in Germany, the members of 
the assembly are elected.  This gives these political leaders the legitimacy to take 
tough strategic decisions on, for example, where urban development should take 
place.  Public leadership responsibilities are, however, dispersed in the sense that 
the city, the counties and the municipalities are autonomous local government units 
who retain responsibilities for most local government services. 
 
2) Considered judgement 
 
The arrangements for regional governance have improved the quality of metropolitan 
decision-making considerably.  In the years before the creation of the VRS 
representatives of units of government within the region were often engaged in fierce 
political conflicts.  The system of regional governance introduced in 1994 has helped 
to shift the local political culture away from territorial disputes and towards an attitude 
that is more focused on problem solving for the wider area.  This is certainly a feature 
of the work carried out by the three committees of the assembly.   
 
Decisions of the assembly and the committees can, of course, be taken on the 
majority principle.  But an implicit understanding has grown up that all decisions 
should attract either unanimous support or at least substantial majorities.  On the 
whole members of the assembly consider themselves as representatives of the 
region as a whole and not of a single municipality. 
 
3) Transparency and efficiency 
 
The model of governance for the VRS is clearly set out on the region’s website.  The 
assembly meets five or six times a year and these meetings are public.  Likewise the 
three committees of the assembly also meet in public. The combination of a directly 
elected assembly and a lean planning administration means that, in most cases, the 
decisions of the assembly are implemented relatively swiftly.   
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4) Accountability and legitimacy 
 
All members of the assembly are answerable to the citizens at the ballot box.  Free 
and fair elections are held every five years.  The counties and municipalities have no 
direct veto power over decisions made by the assembly.  However, it is usually the 
case that more than half of the members of the assembly are, at the same time, 
members of a county or municipality.  This cross-membership helps to ensure that 
voices representing local government units are influential within regional governance. 
 
5) Inclusive public involvement 
 
The VRS is involved with several regional networks including networks of churches, 
sports and a regional development association.  These networks are built around 
particular issues or functions, for example, sports facilities, economic development 
and so on.  They provide opportunities for dialogue with civil society that go beyond 
the important roles played by political parties and elections.  Opinions are divided on 
how successful arrangements are for public involvement in the work of the VRS.  On 
the one hand, the transparency of decision-making and the existence of a variety of 
informal networks suggest that public involvement is good.  On the other hand, 
access to the various networks is not necessarily open to all, and it is also the case 
that citizens tend to be more concerned about local issues than with region-wide 
policy making.  However, the process of direct election gives citizens a clear 
opportunity to shape the character and priorities of regional governance. 
 
6) Inclusive business involvement 
 
The business community plays an active role in the work of the VRS.  For example, 
the VRS created a regional development agency in 1995 as a private enterprise.  
The VRS owns 51 per cent of the agency, bears the financial risk and appoints the 
director.  Other shareholders are the municipalities, the development bank of Baden-
Wuerttemberg, the chamber of commerce and to a minor degree the labour unions.  
The Chamber of Commerce and other business organisations operate with the same 
geographical boundary as the VRS and this is considered a major strength. 
 
Sources 
 
Benz A. and Frenzel A. (2002) ‘Institutional policies in a federal state: the creation of 
the Association of the Urban Region of Stuttgart’ pp 153-174 in Jouve B. and Lefevre 
C. (eds) Local power, territory and institutions in European metropolitan regions. 
London: Frank Cass. 
 
Frank A. and Morgan K. (2012) Re-inventing the city: The art of metro-governance in 
the Stuttgart Region. Planning Research Paper 186. Cardiff: Cardiff School of City 
and Regional Planning. 
 
Verband Region Stuttgart: www.region-stuttgart.org 
 
Zimmermann K. (2011) ‘Metropolitan governance in Stuttgart: New regionalism par 
excellence? pp 189-205 in Heinelt H., Razin E. and Zimmermann K. (eds) 
Metropolitan governance. Different paths in contrasting contexts: Germany and 
Israel.  Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. 
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German metropolitan regions’, Urban Research and Practice, Vol 7, No 2, pp 182-
199. 
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5. Strategic choices for combined authorities 
 
 
 
The devolution settlements, agreed in recent months by government and council 
leaders in various parts of the country, have introduced fresh thinking on how to 
improve local governance.  This report suggests that this process of reform and 
innovation can be improved if more attention is now given to: 
 
 deeper reflection on the nature of the challenges now facing sub-national 
governance in England 
 
 the articulation of sound principles to guide the institutional design of 
combined authorities 
 
 careful consideration of alternative models of governance for combined 
authorities. 
 
Strategic choices for combined authorities  
 
The political objectives of devolution and the principles of good governance set the 
scene for a series of organisational design choices.  In this section we use the six 
principles set out in section 3 to highlight important choices and options.  Here our 
emphasis is on learning from international experience provided through the 
innovation studies in section 4. 
 
1) Civic leadership 
 
1.1 A directly elected mayor versus collective leadership models 
 
The Government has taken the view that directly elected mayors should form part of 
the governance arrangements for combined authorities.  The Cities and Local 
Government Devolution Act (2016) does not, however, require combined authorities 
to be led by a directly elected mayor.  The Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government has the discretion to allow different leadership arrangements in 
different combined authorities. 
 
The international evidence shows that different cities have adopted different models 
of city leadership and that no one model is superior to the others.  There is solid 
research evidence from a ‘before’ and ‘after’ study of mayoral governance in Bristol 
to support the claim that directly elected mayors can provide visible leadership.21 
However, it does not then follow that other forms of city leadership should be ruled 
out.  For example, Copenhagen is widely regarded as one of the most liveable cities 
in the world but it does not have a directly elected mayor. 
 
Section 4 contains profiles of four respected models of sub-national governance.  
Two of the Innovation Stories – Auckland Council and the Greater London Authority - 
provide examples of successful metropolitan governance where a directly elected 
mayor plays a key role.  The two other successful city regions – Portland Metro and 
the Association of the Region of Stuttgart – do not have directly elected mayors. 
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In the case of Portland Metro there is a directly elected President.  However, this 
individual does not have independent executive power.  In the case of the 
Association of the Region of Stuttgart the most senior leader is not directly elected at 
all.  The international evidence shows that cities across the world can and have 
thrived without a directly elected mayor. 
 
1.2 Directly elected mayors offer a range of possibilities 
 
For those combined authorities that do decide to opt for a directly elected mayor 
model of leadership it is worth emphasising that, within the mayoral model of 
governance, there is a wide range of options.  In simple terms these can be said to 
rest along a continuum from a ‘strong mayor’ model, in which the mayor has 
substantial executive powers, through to a ‘strong council’ model, in which the mayor 
has comparatively few formal executive powers.22  
 
In some countries the directly elected mayor has formidable executive power – for 
example, the Mayor of New York City.  However, in many cases, the directly elected 
mayor is seen not as a heavyweight executive but as a facilitator, a leader with the 
legitimacy to shape the agenda and the actions of others, not someone with 
enormous personal authority to take decisions.23 
 
In the examples provided in section 4 we can see that both the Mayor of Auckland 
and the Mayor of London have substantial ‘positional’ power.  The mayors in both 
these city regions have a very high public profile and they influence significantly the 
behaviour of other actors inside and outside their cities, but their personal executive 
power is rather limited.   
 
It follows that a whole set of choices open up for mayoral combined authorities 
relating to the balance of power between the mayor and other councillors. 
 
2) Considered judgement 
 
2.1 Discussing the separation of powers 
 
Ever since the passing of the Local Government Act 2000, English local authorities 
have operated on the basis of a ‘separation of powers’ between an ‘Executive’ and 
an ‘Assembly’.  Combined authorities are also required to operate on this basis.  The 
balance of power between the Executive (whether it is an individual or a group) and 
the Assembly is a key issue in relation to ensuring considered judgement in the 
decision-making arrangements of the combined authority. 
 
A major strength of the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act (2016) is that it 
leaves open a wide range of possibilities relating to the balance of power between 
the Executive and the Assembly.  The figure below provides an illustration of the way 
responsibilities of the Executive and the Assembly can be shifted around to achieve 
different objectives.24  
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Figure 5: Illustrative responsibilities of an Executive and an Assembly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In local governments across the world there is huge variation in the way powers are 
distributed between the Executive and the Assembly.  Combined authorities will wish 
to develop their own ideas on this power sharing relationship.  It would also be wise 
to build in opportunities to review the balance of powers in the light of experience. 
 
2.2 Including different voices  
 
Combined authorities wishing to ensure that councillors with different kinds of 
experience are able to exercise senior leadership roles may feel that mayoral models 
have limitations.  That question aside, it is clear that combined authorities, whether 
they have directly elected mayors or not, can invent an array of new arrangements 
for ensuring inclusive leadership in their constitutions.  There are opportunities for 
creating innovative arrangements for a wide range of voices to be heard. 
 
In this respect the Auckland Council arrangements for giving a voice to the Māori 
community, via an Independent Māori Statutory Board (IMSB), may be of interest.  
As explained in section 4.1, members of the IMSB sit on a range of committees and 
have the same input to decision-making as elected members.  Combined authorities 
can, if they wish, consider introducing arrangements to ensure that voices that tend 
to be excluded from active deliberation can, in fact, be included – through special 
institutional arrangements. 
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3) Transparency and efficiency 
 
3.1 Openness in decision-making 
 
There can be little doubt that introducing arrangements to advance transparency 
should be a high priority for combined authorities in England.  The evidence suggests 
that, to date, public understanding of the roles and responsibilities of combined 
authorities is low.  
 
The Innovation Stories in section 4 provide four examples of how sub-national 
governance arrangements have been created that, to varying degrees, advance the 
cause of more transparent and more efficient decision-making.  Strengths of the 
authorities profiled in section 4 are: 
 
 presentation on their websites of explicit details of how decision-making 
works 
 
 clear arrangements for public examination of particular policies and 
practices. 
 
There is room for combined authorities in England to invent new ways of presenting 
issues and public policy choices to their citizens.  The ‘Public Engagement Guide’ 
published by Portland Metro – see section 4.3 – provides an excellent example of 
good practice in relation to transparency and efficiency. 
 
4) Accountability and legitimacy 
 
4.1 Direct election versus indirect election 
 
Should the individuals who serve on combined authorities be directly elected by 
citizens?  Or is a process of indirect election preferable?  Indirect election has, to 
date, been the preferred process used to appoint councillors to serve on combined 
authorities in England.  And, in some cases, partner organisations, such as local 
enterprise partnerships (LEPs), have been invited to nominate individuals to serve on 
the combined authority (sometimes with different voting rights).  
 
The indirect election process has strengths.  It can, for example, build very strong 
links between the localities within the combined authority area and the wider 
metropolitan or non-metropolitan region.  However, it is worth considering whether 
the introduction of direct election arrangements for combined authorities could 
strengthen their accountability and legitimacy.   
 
The Greater London Authority (GLA), profiled in section 4.2, is not, of course, a 
combined authority.  But the model is instructive.  City leaders in other countries tend 
to have a favourable view of the strategic capacity of the GLA, and it is clear that the 
process of directly electing the members of the London Assembly and the Mayor is 
well understood by the citizens of the capital.  Arguably this process strengthens 
public support for metropolitan leadership.  
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The experience of the Association of the Region of Stuttgart, set out in section 4.4, 
suggests that a process of direct election can give a significant boost to the 
legitimacy of civic leaders.  In the years before there was a directly elected regional 
government in the Stuttgart region there was fierce conflict between local authorities.  
The previous regional planning association, which was indirectly elected, was unable 
to rise above these sectional interests.  In the period since 1994 the directly elected 
regional government has fostered a region-wide problem solving culture. 
 
4.2 Scrutiny arrangements 
 
It is essential that combined authorities give early and careful consideration to the 
introduction of effective overview and scrutiny arrangements.  Too often, and this is, 
perhaps, a fault of the ‘devolution deal’ making approach, the process of constructing 
the new arrangements for sub-national governance of various parts of England has 
been confined to a relatively small number of elected members and officers working 
with civil servants and ministers.  
 
In other democratic countries this process is regarded as strangely over centralised.  
To outsiders it may seem that the central state is becoming far too involved in trying 
to determine the detailed design of the governance arrangements, on a selective 
basis, of particular localities in England.   
 
International experience suggests that a much more open process is likely to be both 
more effective in delivering results, and more attractive to citizens. In all four cases 
presented in section 4, there are reasonably strong arrangements in place for holding 
area-wide leadership to account. 
 
5) Inclusive public involvement 
 
5.1 Options for representation 
 
The four Innovation Stories also reveal four different ways of designing 
representative arrangements for sub-national governments.  Portland Metro has a 
directly elected area-wide President and six councillors representing six geographical 
districts in the Metro area.  The model ensures strong overall leadership while also 
ensuring that different areas have a voice.   
 
The Greater London Authority has a directly elected mayor and a London Assembly.  
The Assembly is, in some ways, similar to the Portland Metro in that it has area-
based representatives elected on a constituency basis.  However, the 25-member 
London Assembly has two kinds of representative: fourteen members are elected on 
a constituency basis and eleven are London-wide members. 
 
The representation structure of Auckland Council is multi-level.  It has a directly 
elected mayor and twenty councillors elected on a constituency basis. In addition, 
there are 21 elected local boards dealing with local matters.  Auckland Council also 
has arrangements for giving voice to the Māori community, via an Independent Māori 
Statutory Board (IMSB).   
 
The Association of the Region of Stuttgart is different again.  The 87 members of the 
regional assembly do not represent constituencies at all.  Rather they are elected via 
a system of proportional representation to serve the region as a whole. 
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The four approaches have different strengths and weaknesses, and these 
differences can prompt fresh thinking. 
 
5.2 Opportunities for dialogue and public involvement 
 
Alongside the representative structures just outlined the four authorities presented in 
section 4 have in place a variety of measures to encourage public participation.  As 
well as holding their meetings in public all four sub-national governments provide 
opportunities for citizens to interact directly with their elected representatives, and a 
few are mentioned here. 
 
In Greater London the Mayor and the Assembly Members hold ‘People’s Question 
Time’ meetings where members of the public can ask questions and raise issues.  
London Assembly meetings regularly include an open microphone element whereby 
particular interest groups can address the meeting. 
 
Auckland Council provides a variety of ways for citizens to ‘have a say’ in decision-
making processes.  For example, citizens are free to join the People’s Panel survey 
system – regular surveys seek the views of panel members on issues of concern.  
The council also has a variety of public consultation procedures in place in relation 
to, for example, district plans and local board plans. 
 
The Association of the Region of Stuttgart reaches out to the public via a set of 
regional networks relating to particular topics – for example, sports facilities and 
economic development. 
 
Portland Metro has a particularly sophisticated approach to public involvement.  The 
area has a long-established culture of active civic engagement and there are many 
ways in which Metro discusses policy and practices with citizens.  The ‘Public 
Engagement Guide’ on the Metro website provides an excellent overview of the ways 
in which Metro works with advisory committees, stakeholder groups, interest groups 
and with the public at large. 
 
6) Inclusive business involvement 
 
6.1 Listening to and supporting local business 
 
All four authorities featured in section 4 are active in engaging with business 
interests.  Local enterprise partnerships (LEPs) have been in place across England 
since 2011 and combined authorities are developing a variety of ways of working with 
their LEP or LEPs.   
 
In Greater London the LEP for London, which is known as the London Enterprise 
Panel, is chaired by the Mayor of London.  As noted in section 4.2 this helps to build 
a strong set of relationships between business interests and the Greater London 
Authority.  
 
Turning to international experience, the authorities featured in section 4 adopt a 
variety of strategies for engaging with business interests.  The business community is 
particularly active in the work of the Association of the Region of Stuttgart.  For 
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example, the regional development agency, created in 1995, is an interesting 
public/private partnership.  
 
Auckland Council established a Business Leadership Group to strengthen links 
between the council and the business sector.  The city region is growing and a major 
focus of interest is how to attract new businesses.  Similarly, Portland Metro works 
with business interests to promote the city region nationally and internationally. 
 
Looking forward 
 
It is important to stress that the creation of a combined authority is not a once-and-
for-all process.  The external environment will change, new challenges will emerge 
and different national policies and legislative requirements will be introduced in the 
coming years.  It follows that it will be essential to review the strategic direction and 
changing role of the combined authority over time. 
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6. Annex: The trajectory of devolution in 
England 
 
 
 
This Annex provides an ‘at a glance’ overview of the way devolution policy in 
England has evolved as well as a guide to studies that have examined this process in 
more depth. 
 
Figure 6: Illustrative timeline of English Devolution 
 
 
 
 
Highlights 
 
2009 
 
The Local Democracy, Economic and Construction Act 2009 provided the legal 
structure enabling two or more local authorities to take on statutory functions 
transferred to them by an Order made by the Secretary of State, plus any functions 
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that the constituent authorities agree to share.  Under the Act combined authorities 
can be set up with or without a directly elected mayor. 
 
 
2011 
 
In 2011 Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) became the first combined 
authority.  In 2014 four more combined authorities were established – in the 
northeast, West Yorkshire and in the city regions of Liverpool and Sheffield. 
 
2014 
 
In September 2014 Scotland came close to breaking away from the UK, and the 
Prime Minister’s speech on the morning after the referendum marked a significant 
turning point in the debate about devolution in general, and devolution within England 
in particular. 
 
The first ‘devolution deal’ was agreed with the GMCA in late 2014.   
 
2015 
 
Greg Clark, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government in the newly 
elected Conservative Government, presses ahead with devolution.  Eight ‘devolution 
deals’ were agreed in 2015.  
 
2016 
 
The Cities and Local Government Devolution Act (2016), inter alia, paves the way for 
the creation of combined authorities ‘with greater flexibilities around functions and 
composition, as well as the election of directly elected city region mayors in May 
2017’. 
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